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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WEST GENESEE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, APT, AFL-CIO, LOCAL NO. 3106, 
Charging Party, 
._... -and-... ..  __ .. .. CASE NO. U-17283 
WEST GENESEE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
THOMAS J. CLERKIN, for Charging Party 
BOND, SCHOENECK & KING, LLP (DAVID M. PELLOW of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the West 
Genesee Central School District (District) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) on a charge filed by the West 
Genesee Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, Local No. 3106 
(WGTA). WGTA alleges that the District violated §209-a.l(a) and 
(c) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act (Act) when its 
agents threatened certain teachers who had been appointed by the 
WGTA to a building level Shared Decision Making (SDM) committee 
with insubordination if they attended a training session 
sponsored by the District for members of that SDM committee. 
After a hearing, the A U held that the District violated the 
Act as alleged. The ALT concluded that the District interfered 
with WGTA unit employees * rights under the Act to participate in 
WGTA affairs and discriminated against them for having done so 
when it denied training to WGTA's representatives on the SDM 
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committee under at least an implied threat of discipline should 
they attend the training. 
The District argues that the ALJ erred in failing to make 
several findings of material fact and erred legally in concluding 
that the charge is within our jurisdiction and that the District 
violated the Act. WGTA argues in response that many of the 
District's exceptions are themselves immaterial and that the 
ALJ's decision is correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties1 
arguments, we affirm the ALJ's jurisdictional determination, but 
reverse his merits disposition and, accordingly, dismiss the 
charge. 
As to the jurisdictional issue, although many matters 
involving shared decision making in school districts may be 
within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Education 
(Commissioner), the Commissioner has no jurisdiction over 
allegations that a public employer, by any action, has committed 
an improper practice in violation of §209-a.l of the Act. That 
jurisdiction rests exclusively with PERB-7 subject only to 
judicial review.-7 As we consider only the improper practice 
allegations raised in the charge, we act clearly within the scope 
of our exclusive statutory jurisdiction. 
^The only exceptions to this exclusivity are duty of fair 
representation allegations, which rest concurrently within the 
jurisdiction of the agency and the judiciary, and improper 
practices within the jurisdiction of the New York City Board of 
Collective Bargaining. 
-
;Act §205.5 (d) . 
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Turning to the merits, the ALJ's decision assumes throughout 
that the teachers who were appointed to the building-level SDM 
committee by the WGTA held an absolute right to committee 
membership simply because the WGTA appointed them. But whether 
the teachers are members of the SDM committee is the very issue 
which underlies the entire dispute between these two parties. As 
the shared decision making regulations are silent with respect to 
the selection of teacher representatives to building-level SDM 
committees, the Commissioner has opined that the Commissioner 
lacks the authority under the regulations to resolve disputes 
centering on the selection of those representatives.-'' 
The District and WGTA have a fundamental disagreement as to 
whether the WGTA has a right to control absolutely the 
appointment of teachers to a building level SDM committee. More 
particularly, the disagreement appears to center on whether the 
WGTA can, as it did, subject the teachers1 appointment to that 
SDM committee to rescission at the pleasure of the WGTA 
president. The District believes that the conditions of the 
teachers' appointment to the building-level SDM committee are 
inconsistent with the Commissioner's regulations and the 
District's SDM plan as approved by the Commissioner. The 
District believes that teachers, although selected, according to 
the SDM plan, "through a process developed by the WGTA", are not 
representatives of the WGTA itself. Rather, according to the 
District, the teachers represent the committee and the general 
^Appeal of Roby. 34 Ed. Dep't Rep. 654 (1995). 
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population of teachers in the building. Therefore, in the 
District's view, teachers cannot be appointed by the WGTA with 
conditions which are arguably inconsistent with allegiance to the 
committee and teachers generally. WGTA's belief is distinctly to 
the contrary. WGTA believes that selection of teacher 
representatives to a building-level SDM committee is its right 
absolutely upon whatever terms it considers are appropriate, and 
that the teachers so appointed serve as WGTA representatives. 
Even if we were to assume that the District is incorrect in 
its belief, its actions in denying WGTA appointees committee 
training would still not violate the Act as alleged on any 
theory. The dispute between these parties about the teachers' 
committee membership is what caused all of the District's 
actions, not any motive improper under the Act. The basis for 
the District's denial of SDM committee training was not the 
employees' exercise of any statutorily protected rights. They 
were denied training only because the District does not consider 
the teachers to be qualified members of the SDM committee. The 
District has a right to its good faith opinion that the teacher 
representatives on the building SDM committee are not members of 
that committee given the conditions attached to their 
appointment, just as the WGTA has a right to its contrary good 
faith belief. 
Nor can the District be found in violation of the Act on a 
per se_ basis. The District withheld committee training from the 
teachers appointed by the WGTA only because it believes that they 
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were disqualified from membership on the building-level SDM 
committee given the conditions of their appointment. The 
District obviously has no obligation under the Act to train 
persons for service on an SDM committee if those persons are not 
members of that committee. Just because the teachers were 
appointed to the building-level SDM committee through a "process" 
determined by the WGTA does not necessarily mean that the 
District must treat all of WGTA's appointees as properly seated 
members of that committee regardless of the conditions attached 
to their appointment, anymore so than the District or the WGTA 
would be compelled to accept without question the membership 
status of any other person's appointment to the committee. From 
our perspective, there is at least an arguable difference between 
a "process" of appointment, which may lie within the WGTA's 
exclusive control under the terms of the District's SDM plan, and 
the conditions attached to an appointment made under the WGTA's 
chosen process. If the WGTA, for example, had appointed teachers 
to the SDM committee upon the condition that they could not speak 
at committee meetings, would the District be in violation of the 
Act if it refused to recognize those teachers as members of the 
SDM committee and denied them SDM committee training on that 
basis? We think not, and the condition imposed here is of no 
different character. 
The District is concerned that persons who are required to 
serve at the pleasure of WGTA's president might not represent, as 
the District believes they must, the interests of the committee 
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and teachers generally and, therefore, it believes that those 
appointees are not members of the committee under the 
Commissioner's regulations and its own SDM plan. Whether or not 
we or others might share that concern or consider the District's 
belief reasonable, the District's actions were taken in good 
faith and they find at least arguable support under the terms of 
the SDM plan. 
To find the District in violation of the Act, we would have 
to hold that the WGTA had the right to appoint whomever it wished 
to a building-level SDM committee subject to whatever conditions 
it wished to impose upon that appointment. As the Commissioner's 
regulations are silent on the issue, the regulations cannot be 
the source of such a right. The SDM plan cannot be the source of 
such an unqualified right because the plan is subject to 
different interpretations. In such circumstances, a simple 
disagreement between the parties as to the intent of an SDM plan 
and the parties' rights pursuant thereto cannot and should not 
become the basis for a violation of the Act. 
Statements by District agents to certain of the teacher 
appointees to the SDM committee that they either should not or 
could not attend the committee training sessions because the 
District did not accept them as committee members, and that they 
might or would be deemed insubordinate were they to attend that 
training session, do not alter our previously stated analysis of 
the interference and discrimination allegations presented in this 
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case.-7 The teacher appointees of WGTA were simply not 
disadvantaged or threatened because of any statutorily protected 
activities. They were denied training only because they were not 
considered by the District to be members of the SDM committee, 
not because they were appointed by the WGTA. Nonmembership on 
the SDM committee was the basis for the District's actions and 
statements, not the exercise by any teacher of any right 
protected by the Act. The teachers' arguable statutory right to 
work with and through the WGTA's processes for selection as an 
SDM committee representative is intact, but their exercise of 
rights in that regard does not warrant or compel the sacrifice of 
the District's right to question the employees' status as 
committee members. The District is not forced by the 
interference and discrimination provisions of the Act to abandon 
its own good faith opinion regarding committee membership and to 
accept WGTA's contrary opinion on that issue without question. 
This record evidences nothing more than two parties with 
very firm opposing positions taken in good faith on issues that 
are unresolved by Commissioner regulation or opinion and which do 
not on the facts of this case implicate the exercise of any 
rights protected by the Act. The charge is, accordingly, 
properly dismissed, a dismissal ordered with an awareness that 
the dispute between these parties may not be subject to an 
adjudicatory resolution under the Commissioner's existing 
regulations as interpreted. The possible absence of an 
-
7We express no opinion as to whether such statements or actions 
pursuant thereto would violate the District's bargaining 
obligations as that issue is not presented by this charge. 
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adjudicatory forum is not, however, a reason to create one under 
the Act's improper practice provisions, a mechanism ill suited, 
at best, to resolve such disputes. We are also concerned about 
the implications of a contrary decision. Subjecting 
disagreements about the meaning of an SDM plan to improper 
practice jurisdiction could involve us regularly and deeply in 
reviewing the shared decision making process, which we do not 
believe was ever intended to be adversarial to any degree or open 
to regular review outside of the educational context. We do not 
suggest that all disputes arising in the shared decision making 
context are never subject to review under an improper practice 
charge. Resolution of the particular dispute which prompted this 
charge, however, is best obtained through the same cooperative 
effort which initially gave rise to the SDM plan or through 
actions authorized under the Commissioner's regulations, such as 
an amendment, as necessary, to the SDM plan. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
reversed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF CARMEL POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, .. 
-and-
TOWN OF CARMEL, 
Respondent. 
RAYMOND G. KRUSE, P.C. (RAYMOND G. KRUSE of counsel), for Charging 
Party 
ANDERSON, BANKS, CURRAN & DONOGHUE (STUART S. WAXMAN of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case first came to us in 1996 on exceptions filed by the Town of Carmel Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc. (PBA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)-
rendered on the PBA's charge against the Town of Carmel (Town). In relevant part, the PBA 
alleges in its charge that the Town violated §209-a. 1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when, effective January 1, 1996, it unilaterally changed a practice pursuant 
to which unit employees were granted vacation time which overlapped the vacation time selected 
CASE NO. U-17383 
i ^ P E R B H4612(1996). 
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by other police department personnel so long as predetermined minimum staffing levels set by the 
Town were maintained. 
After a hearing, the ALJ dismissed the charge on the ground that the restrictions on 
overlapping vacations- effected by the Town's change in the prior practice were not mandatory 
subjects of negotiation because, by restricting overlapping, the Town was increasing the number 
of employees scheduled to be on duty at any given time. Citing City of Yonkers.- the ALJ held 
that a decision regarding the number of employees who are to be on duty at any given time is one 
which an employer need not negotiate. 
The PBA filed exceptions to the ALJ's decision. In a November 1996 decision and order,-
we declined to consider those exceptions, concluding that both jurisdictional and merits issues 
raised by the charge were appropriately deferred to the parties' contractual grievance procedure 
because the parties had reached an agreement in December 1994 on the aspect of vacation picks 
at issue under this charge. According to the record, the parties agreed that overlapping would be 
permitted, except on the Fourth of July, so long as predetermined minimum staffing levels set by 
the Town were maintained. Uncertainty as to whether that agreement was in effect beyond 1995 
persuaded us that the charge was appropriately deferred to the parties' grievance arbitration 
procedures. The charge was conditionally dismissed subject to a motion to reopen. The case 
comes to us now on motion by the PBA, opposed by the Town, to reopen the case. 
-''Basically, the change disallowed two or more unit employees on the same tour from being on 
vacation at the same time. 
^lOPERB 1|3056(1977). 
^29 PERB 1J3073 (1996). 
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By award dated May 20, 1997, an arbitrator determined that the parties11994 agreement 
regarding vacation selection and approval which permitted overlapping did not apply after 1995. 
As determined by the arbitrator, "the parties do not have an applicable and enforceable agreement 
for years beyond 1995 with respect to the Town's vacation selection and approval process". 
There being no agreement covering vacation selections for 1996 and after, a consideration of the 
merits of this charge is not barred by law or policy. Therefore, we grant the PBA's motion and 
now consider the exceptions to the ALJ's decision. 
The PBA argues that the ALJ's decision is factually and legally incorrect. The Town 
states in response that certain of the PBA's exceptions are themselves inaccurate. The Town 
otherwise argues that the ALJ's decision is correct on the material facts and the law and should be 
affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the ALJ's 
decision. 
Like this case, City of Yonkers also involved a vacation pick system. The vacation system 
which the employer changed in City of Yonkers had enabled a large number of employees to be 
on vacation at what were considered prime vacation times. The employer substantially decreased 
the number of employees who could be on vacation at the same time by requiring an equal number 
of employees to select vacation during each of the many available vacation periods. In net effect, 
many employees in City of Yonkers were denied vacations which they could have had under the 
prior system. Citing an earlier decision in City of White Plains.- the Board in City of Yonkers 
-'5 PERB U3008 (1972). 
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held that the employer did not violate its duty to negotiate by changing the vacation pick system 
because the change affected not the amount of vacation time, only the number of employees 
scheduled to be on duty at specific times, a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
The central premise of the PBA's exceptions is that City of Yonkers is distinguishable 
because the vacation pick system in this case incorporates a minimum departmental staffing 
guarantee of four or five officers on any given tour. As overlapping vacations were permitted 
under the practice which the Town changed only so long as these minimum staffing levels 
established by the Town were maintained, the PB A argues that the Town's managerial interests 
are fully protected. 
The PBA's arguments misapprehend the nature of an employer's managerial interests in 
setting staffing levels. Minimum staffing levels are exactly what the words in the phrase suggest, 
i.e., changeable minimums. Just as an employer may initially fix unilaterally a specified minimum 
staff complement, an employer has an equal managerial right to change unilaterally those staffing 
levels to coincide with its belief regarding the number of personnel needed or wanted for the 
delivery of a service of a desired type or level. In the delivery of that chosen service, an employer 
may at any given point in time unilaterally increase, decrease or keep constant the staffing level 
fixed at an earlier point in time. By making those decisions, an employer is simply determining, 
for example, that one minimum is too low or too high and that a higher or lower minimum is 
necessary or desirable in its opinion. The Town here determined that more personnel had to be 
scheduled for duty to provide essential services and its actions are indistinguishable from those 
taken by the employer in City of Yonkers. 
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Although the Town's former vacation pick system, which permitted overlapping, may have 
ensured a minimum staff complement of four or five officers on any given day, it did not protect 
the full range of the Town's managerial prerogatives regarding staffing. The practice of granting 
early requests for overlapping vacations prevented the Town from scheduling for duty the number 
of employees it wanted at given times. Just as in City of Yonkers, the restrictions the Town 
placed upon requests for overlapping vacation only decreased the number of employees who 
could be on vacation at the same time, thereby necessarily increasing the number of employees 
scheduled for duty, so as "to provide essential patrol and supervisory personnel during vacation 
periods". 
The changes made by the Town in this case actually affected unit employees to a far lesser 
degree than did the change made by the employer in City of Yonkers. For example, the Town, 
according to the PBA, still permits overlapping under requests for time off made later in the year 
and closer to the requested date off from work, so long as the Town is then persuaded that the 
minimum staffing levels it wants are maintained. That the Town was willing later in the year to 
reconsider requests for vacation, or other forms of time off earlier denied, in no way changes the 
negotiability of the denial of requests to overlap vacations made earlier in the year. The early 
denial of requests to overlap vacations necessarily affected, at least temporarily, only the number 
of employees scheduled for duty and when they could take vacation. City of Yonkers makes 
those issues nonmandatory subjects of negotiation no matter that the employer might later in its 
discretion change its mind and grant vacations which it had earlier denied. 
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In applying City of Yonkers. we emphasize that the only issue before us is the point in 
time vacation may be taken by some unit employees, not the amount of vacation time to which 
any unit employee is entitled to take. We do not hold or suggest that City of Yonkers would be 
properly applied in any circumstances other than those presented in this particular case. We hold 
only that the ALJ correctly applied City of Yonkers on the facts of this case because the vacation 
overlapping practice changed by the Town was necessarily and inextricably entwined with the 
Town's staffing determinations. As the practice embraced a nonmandatory subject of negotiation, 
the Town's unilateral change in that practice, and its refusal to negotiate the decision to make that 
change pursuant to demand, did not violate its duty to negotiate. 
For the reasons set forth above, the PBA's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
ael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
ti(m~ 
Marc A. AbbotfTMember 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SYRACUSE POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15744 
CITY OF SYRACUSE, 
Respondent. 
ROCCO A. DEPERNO, ESQ., for Charging Party 
JOSEPH E. LAMENDOLA, CORPORATION COUNSEL (BRIAN J. 
LAURI of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Syracuse Police Benevolent Association 
(PBA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) on a charge filed by the PBA against 
the City of Syracuse (City). The PBA alleges that the City violated §209-a. 1(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when a Civilian Review Board (CRB), a body established 
by local law, unilaterally implemented procedures compelling PBA unit employees to participate 
in hearings before the CRB concerning citizen complaints against the police officers whom the 
PBA represents. 
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The ALJ conditionally dismissed the charge, finding that provisions in Article 16 of the 
parties' 1993-97 contract, in effect when the charge was filed, set forth a comprehensive 
disciplinary system for police officers who are called by the City- to participate in investigations 
of citizen complaints which may lead to a police officer's discipline. Concluding that the 
contractual procedures arguably constituted the exclusive means by which PBA unit employees 
may be investigated and disciplined, and that the CRB procedures differed from those in the 
contract, the ALJ held that the charge presented jurisdictional issues under §205.5(d) of the Act 
which were appropriately deferred to the parties' grievance procedure pursuant to the 
jurisdictional deferral policy established under Herkimer County BOCES - and expanded in 
Town of Carmel-
The PBA argues in its exceptions that the charge should not have been deferred 
jurisdictionally because the CRB's procedures constitute a process not governed by the parties' 
agreement and because the issue presented by the charge has "state-wide impact". The City has 
not responded to the PBA's exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
PERB is without power over improper practice charges which raise contract violations not 
otherwise constituting an improper practice. The jurisdictional deferral policy we have established 
^For purposes of her decision, the ALJ accepted as true the PBA's allegation that the CRB is an 
agent of the City for all purposes relevant to this charge. 
^20 PERB 1J3050 (1987). 
^29 PERB 1J3073 (1996). 
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in the cases relied upon by the ALJ is the alternative to the unconditional dismissal which would 
otherwise be required for charges presenting only arguable violations of contract. The ALJ did 
not hold that the CRB's procedures are governed by the parties' contract. Nor did the ALJ hold 
that the CRB's procedures are not governed by the parties' contract. Those are not the relevant 
issues. Rather, the ALJ held correctly that the provisions in the parties' contract, reasonably read, 
are arguably the only ones by which any PB A unit employees can be investigated pursuant to 
citizen complaints. Therefore, as and to the extent the CRB's procedures are different from the 
contractual procedures, the City has arguably violated that contract if, as the PB A alleges, it or its 
agent, CRB, has required PBA unit employees to participate in CRB hearings. The PBA's 
charge, therefore, necessarily alleges a contract violation triggering the jurisdictional limitations in 
§205.5(d) of the Act. The contractual issues which are raised by the charge were appropriately 
deferred by the ALJ to arbitration or other appropriate forum pursuant to our jurisdictional 
deferral policy under Town of Carmel. 
As the jurisdictional questions raised by the charge concern our power to entertain it, the 
perceived importance of the allegations set forth in the charge are not material to our analysis. 
We not do not have any power to entertain arguable contract violations even if the charge which 
presents those contract violations on some standard might be deemed important to one or both 
parties to that charge. There are only two options when this type of jurisdictional issue is 
presented by an improper practice charge, neither of which is a disposition of the charge on the 
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merits. Were we not to conditionally dismiss this charge pursuant to our jurisdictional deferral 
policy, the alternative would be an unconditional dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.-'' 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is affirmed and the PBA's exceptions 
are denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, conditionally 
dismissed subject to a motion to reopen in accordance with our jurisdictional deferral policy. 
Dated: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
MichaekR. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
4 / 
-' Citv of Rochester. 26 PERB f3049 (1993), confd sub nom. Rochester Police Locust Club. Inc. 
v. Kinsella. 27 PERB 1J7003 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Co. 1994) (establishment of civilian review board 
presented arguable violation of contractual disciplinary procedures outside PERB's jurisdiction). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MALCOLM G. KING 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-18145 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 100, 
Respondent, 
-and-
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
MALCOLM G. KING, pro se 
O'DONNELL, SCHWARTZ, GLANSTEIN & ROSEN (HOWARD WEIN of 
counsel), for Respondent 
MARTIN B. SCHNABEL, ACTING VICE-PRESIDENT AND GENERAL 
COUNSEL (DANIEL TOPPER of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Malcolm King to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his charge that the Transport Workers Union, Local 
100 (TWU), violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
failed to produce witnesses on his behalf at his disciplinary arbitration, when it failed to respond 
to an inquiry he had made to the TWU president about those witnesses and when TWU's attorney 
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was abusive to him during the disciplinary arbitration. Although no separate violation is pled 
against the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), it is a statutory party pursuant to §209-
a.3 of the Act.1 
The ALJ determined that the TWU had not breached its duty of fair representation to 
King and dismissed the charge, basing the decision on credibility resolutions in favor of TWU's 
witnesses and against King. King argues in his exceptions that the ALJ erred in crediting the 
TWU's witnesses' testimony instead of his testimony and that the ALJ's decision should, 
therefore, be reversed. Neither the TWU nor the NYCTA has responded to King's exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of King's arguments, we affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
King was employed by the NYCTA as a maintainer from 1995 until July 24, 1996, when 
he was terminated pursuant to a disciplinary arbitration award finding that he had reported to 
work late one day, had made a late sick call on another day2 and had been loud, boisterous, 
abusive and insulting to a supervisor. The arbitration award was also based on King's 
employment record, which showed that he had received a warning, a reprimand, and two 
suspensions from work, coupled with a final warning, during the years of his employment. 
Finding that King had failed to heed that final warning, the arbitrator sustained his termination by 
the NYCTA. 
xThat section of the Act requires that the employer be made a party to any improper 
practice charge in which it is alleged that the union has breached its duty of fair representation in 
the processing or failure to process a claim that the employee organization has violated the terms 
of the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the employer. 
2King admitted these two charges at the arbitration hearing. 
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King alleged in his charge that the TWU failed to produce two witnesses he wanted to 
testify at the disciplinary arbitration, that the TWU president, Willie James, failed to respond to 
his request for information about the TWU's position regarding the two witnesses and that his 
TWU representative was rude and abusive to him at the disciplinary hearing. The record shows, 
however, that King's representatives reviewed statements obtained by King from his pjy^Watrist 
and his speech therapist and decided that they had no testimony to offer which was relevant to 
King's case3 and that the TWU had a policy of not paying for "expert" witnesses for disciplinary 
arbitrations. This policy was explained to King by his representatives and by James, who told 
King, when he met with King at King's request, that the TWU could not afford to pay for expert 
witnesses.4 King seemed to expect that there would be an additional response from James, but 
there is no record evidence supporting King's assumption. In any event, during preparations on 
the morning of the arbitration, King's representatives reiterated to him that the TWU would not 
pay for the two witnesses, but if King wanted to pay for them himself, they would obtain an 
adjournment. 
King's final exception is that the TWU representatives were rude and insulting to him at 
the arbitration hearing. At one point during the proceeding, King opined to his attorney, in a loud 
voice, that the NYCTA witness was lying. The TWU representative called for a recess and told 
3In the written statements, the psychiatrist pointed out that King was being treated for 
stress and the speech therapist opined that King's Caribbean background and speech patterns 
might contribute to a misunderstanding between King and his supervisors. 
4King was apparently referring to a request which he made during his meeting with James 
in May 1996 that the policy be reconsidered in his case. King alleged that he had not received a 
response until the day of his hearing in July 1996. 
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King that he could not speak in such a loud voice, that he would have a chance to testify, that his 
behavior was childish, and that he must allow the hearing to proceed in an orderly fashion. 
The record fully supports the ALJ's findings of fact and we conclude that there is no 
reason in the record to disturb the ALJ's credibility resolutions. There is no evidence of the 
arbitrary, discriminatory or bad faith conduct which would breach TWU's duty of fair 
representation to King. He was represented at each step of the disciplinary grievance procedure 
up to and including the arbitration hearing. His request for expert witnesses was handled in 
accordance with what is undisputedly TWU's normal practice»and King was even afforded an 
opportunity to seek an exception to the policy from the TWU president, with whom he met 
personally. Finally, there is no evidence in the record that the TWU representatives behaved 
inappropriately in their handling of King's arbitration hearing. The comments made to King 
evidence no more than a concern about, or possibly a frustration with, King's behavior at the 
hearing and its impact on the arbitration panel. 
Based on the foregoing, King's exceptions are denied and the decision of the ALJ is 
affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT the charge must be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
-^VUUJ^JL 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALT) dismissing its charge that the Connetquot Central School District (District) violated §209-
a. 1(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it required Marie Moffett, the 
CSEA unit president, to submit a doctor's note each time she used sick leave. The ALJ found 
that the requirement was not imposed upon Moffett because of her union activities. 
CSEA excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the business reasons given by the 
District for its actions were necessarily pretexts disguising anti-union animus because similarly 
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situated employees were treated differently than Moffett. The District has filed a response to the 
exceptions, arguing that the ALJ's decision is correct and should be affirmed. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Moffett isa.bus..driver for the District and has been president of the transportation unit of 
CSEA since 1994. Crediting the testimony of the District's witnesses, the ALJ found that the 
District became concerned with excessive sick leave use by bus drivers in late 1994 and early 
1995. Pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaimng agreement with CSEA1, the District's 
Assistant Superintendent for Transportation, James Marran, directed his assistant, Judith 
Clemente, to conduct an attendance review. Clemente drafted a list of twenty employees with 
whom she intended to meet regarding their use of sick leave. Marran testified that Moffett was an 
yIn relevant part, the District-CSEA contract provides as follows: 
Should the employee's building administrator or supervisor be concerned with an 
employees's attendance record, the following steps shall be taken: 
1. The direct supervisor will meet with the staff member and informally discuss the 
nature of the concern with the employee. 
2. After a reasonable period of time, to be determined by the supervisor, if the 
absentee problem has continued, a formal letter will be sent to the employee stating the 
nature of the concern. In addition, the supervisor shall arrange a meeting among the 
affected employee, the supervisor, and the Superintendent or his designee. The employee 
may bring a Union representative to this meeting. 
3. The meeting will be held at a mutually convenient time and will be intended to 
produce a satisfactory resolution to the problem. Following the said meeting, the 
Superintendent or his designee who conducted the meeting shall issue a letter to the 
employee stating the administration's concern with the employee's attendance. Further, 
subject to the discretion of the administration, the employee may be required to: 
a. Substantiate further use of sick days by a physician's note for up to the balance 
of the then current school year and/or be required to substantiate all requests for personal 
leave by submission of a written letter setting forth the reason(s) underlying the personal 
leave request for up to the balance of the then school year and the next following school 
year. 
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employee with whom Clemente met in mid-January 1995.2 After the January meetings with 
employees, Clemente and Adele Mottl, the Administrative Assistant for Business, continued to 
monitor the bus drivers' attendance and determined that they would schedule a step 2 meeting for 
those employees whose attendance had not improved. Thereafter, on May 30, 1995, Mottl sent a 
jnemorandum to John Walsh, the Assistant Superintendent for Administration and Personnel^ 
saying that she and Marran had reviewed the attendance records of the bus drivers and found that 
ten, including Moffett, were still having attendance problems. She requested that Walsh send 
each driver a letter, outline the problem and arrange for individual meetings, pursuant to the 
contractual attendance review procedure. Walsh sent the letters and met with Moffett in June 
1995. Mottl, Clemente and Laura Spano, the Supervisor of Transportation, also attended the 
meeting. At the meeting, Moffett confirmed that she was often absent due to her husband's 
disability. The meeting also dealt with Moffett's frequent absences on Fridays and/or Mondays. 
By memorandum dated June 28, 1995, Walsh instructed Moffett that she was required for the 
coming school year to substantiate with a doctor's note absences due to her illness or family 
illness. 
Moffett testified that there was an ongoing dispute between the District and CSEA which 
arose in the Spring of 1995 about the drivers' use of sick and personal leave. She believed that 
the District had unilaterally implemented a plan by which employees who had exhausted their sick 
leave would have to charge absences to personal leave, rather than taking a day without pay. At a 
labor-management meeting in April 1995, Moffett asserted to Marran and Clemente that such a 
policy violated the collective bargaining agreement and that CSEA would file a grievance if it 
-Clemente is no longer an employee of the District and did not testify at the hearing. 
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continued. MofFett also apparently referred the District to the terms of the collective bargaining 
agreement covering sick leave abuse and suggested to District agents that they use the attendance 
review procedure to address their perception that there was excessive use of sick leave. 
Afterward, MofFett circulated a petiton throughout the membership which supported her position 
and which was signedjjyjseveral unit^employees. 
At the next labor-management meeting in May 1995, Marran told MofFett that the District 
was going to follow her suggestion and begin attendance reviews of employees with attendance 
problems, including MofFett. In June 1995, Marran met with three oFthe ten employees on the 
list whom the District believed had not improved their attendance between January and May 
1995. Meetings with the remaining employees were completed in December 1995.3 
CSEA asserts in its exceptions that other employees had worse attendance records than 
MofFett and yet they were not subjected to a step 2 meeting nor were they required to bring in a 
doctor's note when using sick leave. This, CSEA alleges establishes that the District's articulated 
concern with Moffett's excessive use oFsick leave was pretextual. This allegation was considered 
by the ALJ and we find no reason in the record to disturb his findings. Based on their demeanor 
and their clear, unhesitant testimony, the ALJ credited the testimony oFthe District's witnesses 
over that oFCSEA's witnesses. The ALJ Found that the District initially raised concerns about 
attendance in December 1994, and met with many employees in January 1995, well beFore 
MofFett had addressed any concerns at labor-management committee meetings about the 
-Walsh testified that he was only able to meet with MofFett and two other employees in June 1995 
because it was the end oFthe school year and the bus drivers did not work in July and August. He 
completed the meetings pursuant to the contractual procedure in December 1995, after MofFett 
questioned Marran as to whether any other employees had been interviewed a second time. 
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District's new policy on use of personal leave. He further found that the reasons given by the 
District for meeting with only three of the ten employees identified as having unimproved 
attendance records in June 1995 were plausible and were uncontroverted by CSEA.4 
CSEA further argues that the District's improper motivation is also evidenced by remarks 
made by Spano to„theeffect.that.Moffetthad„"opened„aPandora's.box"„bymentioning.in_the_fall_ _ 
of 1995 that the remaining step 2 interviews had not yet taken place. We reject CSEA's argument 
that Spano's remark establishes the District's animus towards Moffett. The ALJ found that 
Spano's remark evidenced her reluctance to conduct the attendance review and reflected her 
concern that she would have to complete the step 2 interviews because Moffett raised the issue.5 
The record supports the ALJ's credibility resolutions as to this issue. 
The District had a legitimate concern about the attendance of several employees, one of whom 
was Moffett. Her treatment was not so dissimilar from the other employees as to establish that the 
District was improperly motivated in reviewing her sick leave use. To accept CSEA's theory, we 
would have to conclude that the many other employees who were included in the initial review 
-CSEA claims that six employees had worse attendance records than Moffett and were not called 
in for attendance review. The ALJ found that the record established that only three employees 
had taken more sick days than Moffett subsequent to February 1995. Of those three, one could 
not be scheduled for step 2 meeting because the step 1 meeting had not been held in January 
1995, and one had taken more sick days than Moffett, but not more total days. Additionally, 
Moffett had several Fridays and/or Mondays charged to sick leave, which was of additional 
concern to the District. Only one of the employees who had a step 1 interview had a worse 
attendance record than Moffett and Moffett had more absences than five of the ten employees 
listed for a step 2 interview. 
5/Spano testified that she had not wanted to conduct the attendance review in the first place and 
thought the issue of abuse of sick leave was dead at the end of the 1994-95 school year. When 
Moffett raised the issue in the fall of 1995, Spano reinstituted the review procedure for the 
remaining seven employees. 
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process and those who were reviewed at step 2 were made part of those processes simply to 
cover-up the District's intent to retaliate against MofFett. There is nothing persuasive in the 
record to support such a conclusion. 
Based on the foregoing, we dismiss CSEA's exceptions and affirm the ALJ's decision. 
IT IS,_TIffiJREFORE,J^DEJ^D that the charge must be,L and it.hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
\ 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Joan A. Vreeland to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). In early May 1997, 
Vreeland filed this charge alleging, as amended, that her employer, the New Paltz Central School 
District (District), violated §209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Public .Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) and that her union representative, the New Paltz United Teachers (NPUT), violated 
§209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Act. Vreeland alleges that the District is not paying her correctly under 
the contractual salary schedule1 and that NPUT is not acting quickly or decisively enough to 
1
 Vreeland believes that her salary should reflect a masters degree with 60 credits, not a 
masters degree with 30 credits, the column under which she has been placed since she was hired 
by the District in 1983. 
- and-
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correct that contract violation, even though it filed in 1995 a salary grievance on behalf of 
Vreeland and several others which is still pending. 
The Director dismissed the charge against the District and NPUT as deficient. As to the 
District, the Director determined that there were no facts pleaded to evidence that the District's 
calculation ofVreeland's salary wasjnjmy wayrekted^ 
the Act. As to NPUT, the Director concluded that the allegations of statutory impropriety were 
both conclusory and untimely. 
Vreeland argues in the exceptions that her charge, as filed and amended, is supported by 
numerous facts clearly establishing the violations alleged. In their responses, the District and 
NPUT argue that the Director's decision is correct and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments,2 we affirm the 
Director's decision. 
The sections of the Act allegedly violated by the District are intended to protect the rights 
granted employees by the Act. An employer's violation of an employee's contractual salary rights 
by payment to that employee at a rate lower than that allegedly required by that contract does not 
set forth a cognizable violation of §209-a. 1(a), (b) or (c) of the Act. Similarly, an employer's 
refusal to respond to an employee's demand for information regarding a contractual salary dispute 
is not conduct proscribed by the cited sections of the Act for there again is no form of interference 
with statutorily protected rights. 
^Pursuant to §204.11 of our Rules of Procedure, we have not considered Vreeland's reply 
to the responses because it was neither requested nor authorized by us. 
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The allegations against NPUT were properly dismissed by the Director as untimely. 
NPUT's alleged nonresponses to inquiries Vreeland made regarding her grievance and her 
requests for documents relevant thereto occurred more than four months before this charge was 
filed.3 Having not recognized a continuing violation concept,4 these particular allegations against 
NPUT are untimely. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is affirmed and the exceptions are 
denied. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
//Ik c/i C 
' Marc A. Abbott, Member 
3Section 204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure requires charges to be filed within four 
months of the acts constituting the alleged improper practice. 
4New York City Transit Auth.. 10 PERB p077 (1977); CitvofYonkers. 7 PERB p007 
(1974). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LYNN S. JOWERS, 
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- and -
GREEN CHIMNEYS CHILDREN'S SERVICES, 
Respondent. 
LYNN S. JOWERS, ero se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Lynn S. Jowers to a decision rendered by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) on an improper practice 
charge filed by Jowers against the Green Chimneys Children's Services (Green Chimneys).1 The 
Director dismissed the charge because there were no allegations even suggesting that her 
termination from employment for misconduct and "erratic behavior" was in any way related to her 
exercise of any rights granted her under the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
The exceptions merely reiterate Jowers' belief that her termination from employment was 
unfair and unconstitutional because she did not engage in any misconduct, an allegation Jowers 
claims was falsely made by Green Chimneys without good cause to "discredit [her] name as a 
worker, and as a person". 
JThe Director did not decide whether Green Chimneys is a public employer. By affirming the 
Director's dismissal of the charge, we also do not make any findings in that respect. 
CASE NO. U-19186 
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An employer's dismissal of an employee from employment for reasons unrelated to an 
exercise of rights under the Act, whether or not for good cause, is not subject to this agency's 
regulation or review pursuant to an improper practice charge filed by the aggrieved individual. 
The Director's decision is, accordingly, aflBrmed for the reasons stated in his decision and the 
exceptiojisjre^enied. ....._ _ _ „ _ . _ . _ _ _ „ _ _ 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
m. y 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Susan Girolamo to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT) dismissing her charge alleging that the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 72 (Local 72 or Teamsters) had violated §209-a.2 (a) and (c) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it misled her about the filing of a 
grievance, refused to supply her with information she needed to file a grievance and refused to 
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process a grievance on her behalf. The New York State Thruway Authority (Authority) was 
made a party pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act.1 
The ALJ determined that the Teamsters' assessment of Girolamo's request that a 
grievance be filed was not arbitrary or discriminatory or made in bad faith. The ALJ further found 
_that_therecord_did„not_supporta finding that representatives of the:.Teamsters.had_misled_or_lied__. 
to Girolamo or that it refused her grievance information. Girolamo excepts to the ALJ's decision, 
arguing that the ALJ erred both factually and legally. The Teamsters' response supports the 
ALJ's decision. The Authority has not responded. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Until September 25, 1995, Girolamo was president and a paid business agent of Local 72. 
On that date, Local 72 was placed in trusteeship by Teamsters president Ron Carey and Girolamo 
was removed from those positions.2 Under the terms of the trusteeship, the appointed trustee, 
Joseph Padellaro, was charged with investigating the affairs of Local 72. Pursuant to his 
investigation, Padellaro recommended to Carey that internal union charges be filed against 
Girolamo for her alleged failure to report the alleged illegal activities of Vincent Trerotola, 
previously the principal officer and secretary-treasurer of Local 72. Padellaro also alleged that 
Girolamo aided and abetted Trerotola in his illegal activities and assisted him in attempting a 
secession of Thruway employees from Local 72. Internal union charges were filed against 
-This section of the Act makes the employer a party to a charge alleging that a bargaining agent 
failed to process a claim that the employer breached the collective bargaining agreement. 
-Girolamo resigned her membership in Local 72 on November 30, 1995. 
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Girolamo on March 11, 1996. Carey issued a decision on November 26, 1996, sustaining the 
charges against Girolamo and barring her for life from membership in the Teamsters or any of its 
locals. 
Earlier, in March 1996, Girolamo had questioned Andy Rasulo, Local 72's chief Shop 
Steward,_aboutthe„Thruway'sjwinter maintenance s^chedule.„ Rasulo told her thata grievance had„ 
been filed at the Middletown maintenance division that would cover all maintenance employees, 
including Girolamo. When Girolamo requested a copy of the grievance, Rasulo told her that she 
was not entitled to see it because she was an agency fee payer. Girolamo thereafter objected to 
Padellaro, alleging discriminatory treatment because of her gender and because she had earlier 
filed a complaint against the Teamsters with the State Division of Human Rights. Padellaro 
responded that no grievance had yet been filed and asked Girolamo to provide facts in support of 
her allegations of discriminatory treatment. 
During this time, Local 72's representatives had been making inquiries about the winter 
maintenance schedule, including consulting with Thomas Fitzgerald, Director of Labor Relations 
for the Thruway Authority. From Fitzgerald, they obtained a 1989 consent agreement, entered 
into by Local 72 as a result of negotiations in which Girolamo participated, which Local 72's 
representatives read as giving the Thruway Authority rights to staff under a winter maintenance 
schedule in exchange for a lump sum monetary payment to the unit employees. After a review of 
the consent agreement and consultation with Local 72's counsel, Assistant Trustee Thomas Feeley 
decided that no grievance about the winter maintenance schedule would be filed. At Feeley's 
instruction, Walter Spagnola, Local 72's Business Agent, told Girolamo that Local 72 would not 
file a grievance because of the consent agreement, and he offered her a copy of the consent 
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agreement and grievance forms if she wanted to pursue the grievance on her own. Girolamo 
declined the offer and wrote a letter to Padellaro renewing her demand that Local 72 file a 
grievance about the winter maintenance schedule. 
The ALJ did not credit Girolamo's testimony where it differed from the testimony of 
.....LpcaLZ '^sjvyita^ 
told Girolamo that a class grievance had been filed regarding the winter maintenance schedule and 
then later when Spagnola told her that a grievance had not been and would not be filed. When 
Girolamo first approached Rasulo about filing the grievance, Rasulo repeated to her the 
information he had received from Spagnola that a class grievance was being filed out of the 
Middletown location and that it would cover all maintenance employees. That the Local 72 
\ representatives later determined not to file the grievance as a result of their investigation into the 
merits of a winter maintenance schedule grievance is not a violation of the Act. The grievance 
would have affected all maintenance workers, not just Girolamo. There is nothing persuasive in 
this record which would support a finding that Local 72 chose to forgo filing an otherwise 
meritorious grievance to the detriment of all maintenance workers just to retaliate against 
Girolamo. 
There is also no evidence of any representatives lying to Girolamo. Rasulo had repeated 
the information he had received from Spagnola concerning a winter maintenance grievance. 
When Local 72 decided not to file the grievance, that decision was communicated to Girolamo 
promptly and she was afforded the opportunity to pursue the grievance on her own. Although 
Girolamo asserts that Local 72 refused to provide her with the information she needed to file the 
_) grievance, the ALJ credited Spagnola's testimony that he offered Girolamo the grievance forms 
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and the necessary information and she refused his offer. There is no record support for 
Girolamo's claim that the ALJ erred in making the credibility resolutions upon which that part of 
her decision is based. 
Girolamo also asserts that Rasulo's statement that Girolamo was not entitled to a copy of 
„the_grievance„because_she„was„an_agency shop fee payor is violative, ofiheAct. .The ALL 
determined that Rasulo's comments did not violate the Act because no grievance had actually 
been filed so there was no grievance to show Girolamo.3 The ALJ further found that Rasulo's 
comments had not in and of themselves been alleged in the charge to be a violation of the Act and, 
therefore, she made no finding as to whether Rasulo's statement violated the Act. Girolamo 
argues that this allegation is encompassed in her charge because it broadly alleges that Local 72 
had failed to fairly represent her. The charge, however, focuses on the filing by Local 72 of 
internal union charges against Girolamo in March 1996. While Rasulo's statements are set forth 
in the charge, the incident is not referenced as a separate violation of the Act and we, therefore, 
do not reach it as it was not presented as a separate violation of the Act. 
Girolamo excepts to the ALJ's determination that Local 72 did not violate the Act when it 
told Girolamo she could file the grievance on her own. Under Girolamo's tenure in office, 
employees were not allowed to file grievances on their own. Local 72's offer to Girolamo that 
she could file a grievance is not improper, where, as here, there is no evidence that any change in 
the grievance practice was arbitrary or discriminatory or made in bad faith. Indeed, if it was a 
change in grievance practice it appears to be an expansion of rights afforded to unit members, not 
a restriction on those rights. 
3/See Transit Supervisors Org, and Transit Supervisors Benev. Ass'n. 25 PERB ^3046 (1992). 
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Finally, Girolamo alleges that the ALJ erred in making statements about her motivation 
which are not supported by the record. As those statements did not affect the disposition of the 
charge, we do not reach the exceptions in this regard. 
For the reasons set forth above, Girolamo's exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
ALJ is affirmed _., 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
el R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the United Federation of Police, Inc. 
(Federation), to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director). On April 29, 1996, Kenneth Swart filed a petition seeking to decertify the Federation 
as the bargaining agent for a unit1 of employees of the Town of Saugerties (Town). The 
CASE NO. C-4535 
xThe unit consists of part-time police officers and court officers. 
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Federation's allegation that the petition was barred by a January 1996 Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) it reached with the Town was the subject of a hearing. Upon the hearing 
record, the Director held that the MOU was not a final agreement and that several items which 
the Federation and the Town were bargaining were still open at the date the petition was filed.2 
_..__. The Federation.argues-in.its-exceptions.that-the-parties-had-reached-agreementonall 
substantial terms and conditions of employment before the petition was filed and that any open 
items were insubstantial. The Town in response argues that the Director's decision is correct as a 
matter of fact and law and should be affirmed. Swart did not file a response to the Federation's 
exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments presented, we affirm the 
•\ Director's decision for the reasons stated in that decision with but brief additional comment. 
The record clearly establishes that employment terms which were considered to be 
substantial in the sense that they had to be finalized as a condition to both agreement and any 
statutory duty to ratify3 remained open at the date this decertification petition was filed. 
Therefore, the petition was not barred by any prior contract and the Director properly ordered an 
election to determine the Federation's majority status. 
2To bar a petition, a contract must be in writing, be signed by the parties, contain substantial 
settled terms and conditions of employment and be ratified if subject to a ratification requirement 
by the parties to the agreement. Capital Dist. Reg'l Off-Track Betting Corp.. 20 PERB 1J3020 
(1986); Farmingdale Union Free Sch. Dist.. 7 PERB ^3073, affg 7 PERB 1J4041 (1974). 
3As did the Director, we make no findings as to whether either the Town or the Federation had a 
reserved right of ratification or whether the Town improperly failed to ratify either the MOU or a 
document tendered to it by the Federation's president on March 27, 1996. Apart from any 
ratification issue, neither document was final in substantial respect for purposes of the contract 
bar doctrine. 
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The Director's decision is affirmed, the Federation's exceptions are denied, and the case is 
remanded to the Director for further processing consistent with this decision. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Mernber 
) 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil Service Employees Association, 
Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Onondaga County Corrections Department Unit #7800-
09, Local 834 (CSEA), to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALT) dismissing its charge 
alleging that the County of Onondaga (County) violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it notified CSEA that it intended to make assignments of unit 
work in conformity with the management rights clause of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement. 
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The ALJ determined that a hearing was not necessary as none of the facts material to a 
disposition of the charge were in dispute. The parties were directed to file briefs and the decision 
was based on those briefs, the pleadings and related correspondence. CSEA excepts to the ALJ's 
decision, arguing that the ALJ erred in finding a proposed amendment to the charge untimely and 
m-deciding that there-wasno-violation- of the Act because-thexharge alleged only thatthe-County 
had announced its future intention of implementing unit work assignment decisions in accordance 
with the parties' contractual management rights clause. The County supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' arguments, we 
affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
In its charge, CSEA alleges that its unit employees have exclusively performed the work 
) of supervising inmates serving sentences of up to one year at the County's Jamesville Penitentiary. 
The County and CSEA were engaged in negotiations in late 1995 and through September 1996 
over a County proposal that CSEA waive exclusivity over unit work in exchange for a job 
security agreement.1 By letter dated September 12, 1996, the County's Director of Employee 
Relations, Peter Troiano, notified CSEA that its last proposals were unacceptable. The letter 
concludes: 
This will also provide notice to you that the New York State Public Employment 
Relations Board has affirmed the Director's decision in Case #U-16853....2 In light 
*The County-CSEA collective bargaining agreement was for the term January 1, 1994 to 
December 31, 1996. 
2Countv of Onondaga and Sheriff of the County of Onondaga. 29 PERB f3046 (1996), 
where we found that the management rights clause in the collective bargaining agreement between 
the Onondaga County Sheriffs Police Association and the County gave the County the right to 
) transfer duties performed by employees in the Association's unit to job titles then represented in a 
separate unit by the Deputy Sheriffs Benevolent Association of Onondaga County, Inc.(DSBA). 
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of this decision the Employer is terminating its participation in negotiations on this 
matter and intends to proceed with implementation of decisions concerning the 
assignment of unit work in accordance with its rights reserved under Article 3 
Management Rights of our current collective bargaining agreement. 
CSEA thereafter filed this charge, alleging, as amended, that the County's refusal to 
negotiate further and the assignment of bargaining unit work to nonunit employees violated the 
Act. The ALJ determined that as no material facts were in dispute, the matter did not require a 
hearing. CSEA was, however, given the opportunity to submit any other facts it wished to offer 
for the record. CSEA filed letters asserting that the charge as filed encompassed both unit work 
performed outside the Jamesville Penitentiary and actions taken by the County after its September 
12, 1996 letter. Thereafter, CSEA sought to allege, in the alternative, that the County had made 
decisions to re-assign to nonunit personnel the work of supervising sentenced inmates which had 
been exclusively performed by CSEA unit personnel. The ALJ rejected these amendments as not 
being encompassed in the details of the original charge and as untimely.3 The ALJ then dismissed 
CSEA's charge because the sole County action covered by the charge was the County's 
announcement that it intended to implement future unit work assignments in accordance with the 
rights reserved to it under the management rights clause of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement and that such a notification was not a violation of the Act.4 
3CSEA filed letters on both March 10 and March 27, 1997, asserting that the charge as 
filed covered work performed by unit members both within the Jamesville Penitentiary and other 
County facilities and that the County's September 12, 1996 letter was not just an announcement 
of the County's intention to act but was in fact a unilateral action of the County to assign unit 
work to nonunit personnel. As the letters were filed more than four months after the action 
complained of, the ALJ rejected them as untimely. Our Rules of Procedure, §204.1(a), requires 
that an improper practice charge be filed within four months of the complained of action. 
4See Middle Country Teachers Ass'n. 21 p012 (1988). 
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In its exceptions, CSEA argues that both it and the County understood the language in the 
County's letter to be an announcement that the County was transferring supervision of sentenced 
inmates to nonunit personnel because the County and CSEA had been negotiating a waiver of 
CSEA's exclusivity and the County broke off negotiations on that subject with its letter. As the 
ALJ found, however, the letter is not a specific announcement of a defined future action. The 
County has not announced any specific action that it will take, only that in the future, assignments 
of work would be made in accordance with rights the County claims it has under the management 
rights clause of the CSEA- County collective bargaining agreement. Such an announcement of 
possible future action5, consistent with existing contract rights, does not violate the Act.6 Actual 
transfers of exclusive unit work would be actionable as would, perhaps, an announcement of an 
unequivocal intent to transfer specific unit work at a future date.7 The nature of the County's 
statement simply does not lend itself to any reasonable review as to whether there has been or will 
be a violation of the Act in the future. 
The amendments filed by CSEA in March 1997, arguing that the County had indeed acted 
on September 12, 1996, to reassign unit work to nonunit personnel were correctly rejected by the 
5CSEA alleged in its March 27 letter to the ALJ that the County had made a decision to 
reassign unit work to nonunit personnel by its September 12 letter. No facts were submitted in 
support of the allegation and the ALJ denied the proposed amendment as untimely filed. 
6See Bd. of Educ. of the Citv Sch. Dist. of the Citv of New York. 19 PERB p015 (1986), 
confd. 75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB 1J7012 (1990) (intervening history omitted). 
7The basis for our decision in this case does not require us to express any opinion about 
Middle Country Teachers Ass'n. supra, note 4, which permits charges to be filed within four 
months from the announcement of an act to take effect at a future date and/or the actual 
implementation date of the announced act. Nothing in this decision should be taken as an 
endorsement or rejection of the principles established in that case. 
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ALJ. The amendments were filed six months after the County's alleged improper action, well 
beyond the four-month filing period accorded to charging parties in §204.1(a) of our Rules. 
CSEA also argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in failing to determine that the work 
of supervising sentenced inmates was exclusively CSEA's unit work, regardless of the location of 
the prisoners. As the ALJdismissed,the charge, it was not necessary for her to reach this 
argument, nor are we required to do so. 
Based on the foregoing, CSEA's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
The charge must be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
hael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FRANCIS WARD, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-18045 
TRANSIT SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION, 
Respondent, 
- and-
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
) Employer. 
ARTHUR GRAE, ESQ., for Charging Party 
O'DONNELL, SCHWARTZ, GLANSTETN & ROSEN (HOWARD WTEN 
of counsel), for Respondent 
MARTIN SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (DANIEL TOPPER of 
counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York City Transit Authority 
(Authority) to a remedial order issued in a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a 
charge filed by Francis Ward against the Transit Supervisors Organization (TSO). The ALJ held 
that TSO breached its duty of fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(a) and (c) of the Public 
) Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it failed to pursue for disciplinary arbitration the 
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testimony and a report of the police officers who were called to the scene of an alleged assault 
against Ward by his supervisor. That incident led ultimately to disciplinary charges being brought 
against Ward by the Authority because the Authority believed that Ward's accusation against his 
former supervisor was false.1 The Authority was made a party to this charge pursuant to 
§209-a.3 of the Act,2 
TSO has not filed any exceptions to the ALJ's holding that it violated the Act as alleged. 
The Authority argues in its exceptions that the remedial order requiring it to "hold open or 
reopen, as necessary, the arbitration record" is inappropriate because it does not have the power 
or right to control the arbitration process. There is no response to the Authority's exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the exceptions, we affirm the entry of a 
remedial order against the Authority, but conclude that the ALJ's order should be modified. 
When the legislature added §209-a.3 to the Act in 1990 to require the joinder of a public 
employer to certain charges alleging that a union has breached its duty of fair representation, it 
simultaneously authorized by amendment to §205.5(d) of the Act the entry of appropriate 
remedial orders against that employer, even though it had not committed any violation of the Act. 
The question before us, therefore, is not whether remedial relief can be entered against the 
xBoth Ward and his supervisor have since retired from employment with the Authority. Ward is 
apparently pursuing the arbitration, notwithstanding his retirement, to clear his name and to 
recover wages he lost while he was suspended without pay. 
2That section of the Act requires that the employer be made a party to any improper practice 
charge in which it is alleged that the union representing an employee has breached its duty of fair 
representation in the processing or failure to process a claim that the employer has violated the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the union and employer. 
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Authority, only whether the particular relief ordered by the ALJ in this case is appropriate to 
"effectuate the policies of [the Act]."3 
As TSO's breach of its duty of fair representation related directly to arbitration 
proceedings, an order affecting those proceedings is clearly appropriate. As the Authority notes, 
however, it alone does not shape or control the arbitration process. That is a process controlled 
jointly by the parties pursuant to their mutual agreement. The ALJ's order directing only the 
Authority to hold open or reopen the arbitration proceeding may, therefore, well be one that the 
Authority alone is legally incapable of performing. But TSO and the Authority together can 
plainly effect that result because an arbitrator serves at their pleasure and direction. The ALJ's 
remedial order, therefore, is appropriately modified to require the TSO and the Authority jointly 
to notify the designated arbitrator that arbitration proceedings on the disciplinary charges against 
Ward are to commence or resume pursuant to the grievance as filed and in accordance with the 
terms of the parties' agreement as it existed at the relevant dates. 
The Authority also argues that the ALJ's order infringes on the arbitrator's power to 
conduct the arbitration proceeding. The ALJ's order as written, however, does not address the 
rights or powers of the arbitrator, only the parties. Therefore, nothing in the ALJ's or our 
remedial order restricts the arbitrator's power to determine the admissibility of any evidence or 
the arbitrator's power to decide any issues raised by the Authority's disciplinary charges or TSO's 
grievance, whether related to arbitrability or the merits. TSO's violation of the Act is remedied by 
requiring the TSO to obtain and offer the evidence in issue and by ensuring, through TSO's and 
the Authority's joint demand, the availability of an arbitration forum in which to offer that 
3Act §205.5(d). 
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evidence. Whether an arbitrator considers that evidence when offered and, if so, for what 
purposes, are decisions for the arbitrator to make, just as they would have been had the TSO 
obtained and offered the evidence in issue of its own volition initially upon Ward's request. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's remedial order is affirmed as modified below. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the TSO: 
1. Cease and desist from acting in bad faith in pursuing the pertinent police report and 
police officers' testimony for the arbitration on the disciplinary charges against 
Ward. 
2. Forthwith undertake such action as is necessary to secure said police report and 
police officers' testimony for said arbitration. 
3. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations normally used to post notices of 
information to unit employees. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the TSO and the Authority jointly notify the designated 
arbitrator that arbitration proceedings on the disciplinary charges against Ward are to commence 
or resume pursuant to the grievance as filed and in accordance with the terms of the parties' 
agreement as it existed at the relevant dates. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the New York City Transit Authority (Authority) in the unit represented by the 
Transit Supervisors Organization (TSO) that: 
1. The TSO will not act in bad faith in pursuing the pertinent police report and police officers' testimony for 
\ the arbitration on the disciplinary charges against Francis Ward. 
2. The TSO will forthwith undertake such action as is necessary to secure said police report and police officers' 
testimony for said arbitration. 
3. The TSO and the Authority will jointly notify the designated arbitrator that arbitration proceedings on the 
disciplinary charges against Francis Ward are to commence or resume pursuant to the grievance as filed and 




TRANSIT SUPERVISORS ORGANIZATION 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by 
any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHARLES J. MUNAFO CASE NO. U-18670 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
In May 1997, this Board received a complaint from Elena Cacavas, Esq., the assigned 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT), about the conduct of Charles J. Munafo at and after a pre-
hearing conference held in this case on April 30, 1997.1 Munafo is the lay representative for the 
charging party, Anthony Imbriale, who alleges in the improper practice charge that his bargaining 
agent, the United Transportation Union, Local 1440 (UTU), engaged in an improper practice in 
violation of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by denying his request for two 
grievance representatives of his choice.2 Imbriale's employer, the Staten Island Rapid Transit 
Operating Authority (SIRTOA), was also named as a party to the improper practice charge. 
The ALJ's misconduct complaint alleges that Munafo repeatedly disrupted the conference 
while in progress and after its end by irrelevant, loud outbursts and physical gestures which 
threatened and intimidated her. 
Munafo and UTU's attorney responded to the ALJ's misconduct complaint. Upon the 
complaint and the responses thereto, this Board determined at its meeting of May 28, 1997, to 
xThe conference had been rescheduled by the ALJ from an earlier date in April, an action 
about which Munafo complained repeatedly on April 30. The conference was rescheduled 
because the attorney for the employer had a death in his immediate family which presented him 
with a conflict on the first scheduled conference date. 
2A different ALJ has dismissed this charge because neither Imbriale nor Munafo appeared 
at the scheduled hearing and exceptions to that decision are pending. 
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conduct an investigation into the ALJ's allegations of misconduct.3 It being apparent that the 
credibility of staff members would likely be in issue, it was determined that the investigation 
would be conducted by a disinterested person not in this Board's employ. Shortly thereafter, 
Sidney H. Asch, a retired judge of the Unified Court System, was appointed to conduct the 
investigation. 
After several days of hearing, Judge Asch issued a written report and recommendations on 
January 22, 1998. Judge Asch found that Munafo's conduct at and after the conference was 
substantially as the ALJ had alleged it to be, and he concluded that the ALT 
had bona fide reason to, and did, fear for her physical safety when 
Mr. Munafo appeared before her, lost control and physically 
followed her and confronted her. 
Upon his findings, Judge Asch recommended that Munafo be "suspended from representing 
persons in PERB matters for six months" and that there be a "permanent revocation of his right to 
represent anyone in hearings" if he should engage in similar conduct in the future. 
The ALJ, the charging party, and the representatives of record were issued a copy of 
Judge Asch's report and recommendations. Although each was invited to respond to the report 
and recommendations, only Munafo responded. Munafo argues that Judge Asch did not address 
alleged contradictions in the witnesses' testimony, a failure which Munafo argues makes Judge 
Asch's findings of fact suspect. Munafo argues also that Judge Asch did not consider all relevant 
evidence nor the ALJ's alleged failure to comply with agency procedures. Attached to Munafo's 
response is a copy of the arguments he submitted to Judge Asch after the close of the hearings 
3Section 204.7(j) of our Rules of Procedure prohibits misconduct at any hearing and 
authorizes the suspension or revocation of a representative's right to appear before the agency 
after notice and hearing. As interpreted, the rule prohibits misconduct at all stages of case 
processing, including conferences. Matter of Hallev. 30 PERB f3023 (1997). 
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before him which incorporated many of the points Munafo makes to us in his response to Judge 
Asch's report and recommendations. 
Having reviewed the record,4 and having considered all arguments, we adopt the report 
issued by Judge Asch and the sanctions he recommended therein.5 
Although Munafo suggests otherwise in his response, the proceedings before Judge Asch 
allowed all persons a full and fair opportunity to explain what happened at the conference. His 
findings of fact are limited to the relevant issues and those findings are entirely consistent with the 
hearing record. The issues Munafo raises are either based on incorrect or inaccurate 
representations of fact, are immaterial to the limited questions before us under this misconduct 
complaint, or require a reversal of Judge Asch's credibility determinations, which the record 
affords us no reasonable basis to even question, let alone reverse. 
We further conclude that the six-month suspension recommended by Judge Asch is 
appropriate. Munafo's conduct on April 30, 1997, during and after the conference in this case, 
was egregious under any reasonable standard and was inexcusable no matter his lack of experience 
or qualifications or the degree of his felt provocation, regardless of nature or source. The privilege 
4The hearings before Judge Asch were transcribed and he properly considered only that 
transcribed record in making his findings and recommendations. 
5Judge Asch also recommended that we adopt "registration requirements" for lay 
representatives. We share Judge Asch's concern about the qualifications of some lay persons to 
represent parties to proceedings before this agency. In recognition of the need to have both an 
informed clientele and qualified representatives, we have offered at least annually for many years a 
variety of training programs which are open to the public. However, legislation recently enacted, 
which codified a party's right to have a nonattorney serve as a PERB representative, simply does 
not allow us to fix minimum qualification standards for any representatives. Section 205.5(j) of 
the Act, as amended on September 25, 1996, permits representation by any person whom a party 
authorizes to act on its behalf. The Legislature intentionally left the evaluation of a 
representative's qualifications to the party appointing the representative, subject expressly to our 
misconduct rules. 
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of representing individuals or entities before this agency carries with it a certain set of 
responsibilities, not the least one of which is a simple duty to observe ordinary principles of 
civility, courtesy and decorum during appearances, even when frustrated or upset. The conduct 
exhibited by Munafo at and after the conference on April 30, 1997, was wholly inconsistent with 
even minimum principles of acceptable behavior and that misconduct is appropriately sanctioned.6 
For the reasons set forth above, and upon the report and recommendations of Judge Asch, 
effective immediately Charles J. Munafo is suspended from representing in any manner any 
parties, persons or entities in any proceedings before this agency for a period of six months from 
the date of this decision.7 He is further warned that his future misconduct may be cause for an 
order from us barring him permanently from serving as a representative at this agency. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
The ALJ orally amended the complaint during the hearing upon discovery that Munafo 
had secretly audio taped the conference despite being told before the conference began that the 
conference discussions were off the record. As the misconduct investigation this Board 
authorized did not include this allegation, we have not considered the taping in finding that 
Munafo engaged in misconduct or in fixing the penalty for that misconduct. Had we considered 
this allegation, we would have found Munafo's secret recording of the conference to be an act of 
misconduct, but we would not increase the penalty beyond that recommended by Judge Asclyyho 
knew of Munafo's taping from the record developed before him. 
) 7The suspension does not bar the consideration of papers filed by Munafo as a party 
representative prior to the date of this decision, including exceptions and motions he may have 
filed in this or other pending cases. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM TAYLOR, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4724 




CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
WILLIAM TAYLOR, for Petitioner 
EPSTEIN, BECKER & GREEN, P.C.(ELLIOT MANDEL of counsel), for 
Employer 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On November 25, 1997, William Taylor (petitioner) filed a 
timely petition for decertification of the Civil Service 
Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(intervenor), the current negotiating representative for 
employees in the following unit: 
Included: All full-time and part-time workers of the 
Department of Public Works. 
Excluded: The Superintendent of Public Works and other 
"employees. 
Case No. C-4724 page 2 
Upon consent of the parties, a mail-ballot election was held 
on May 8, 1998. The results of this election show that the 
majority of eligible employees in the unit who cast valid ballots 
no longer desire to be represented for purposes of 
collective negotiations by the intervenor. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it 
hereby is, decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
a.x£ A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING 
ENGINEERS, LOCAL #3 0, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4751 
HUDSON RIVER PARK CONSERVANCY, 
Employer. 
ADAM IRA KLEIN, ESQ. (MARK SOROKA, of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
KAUFF, MCLAIN & MCGUIRE (CATHLEEN DAWE of counsel), for 
Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On January 28, 1998, the International Union of Operating 
Engineers, Local #3 0 (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure of the Public Employment Relations Board, a 
timely petition seeking certification as the exclusive 
representative of certain employees of the Hudson River Park 
Conservancy (employer). 
Thereafter, the parties executed a consent agreement in 
which they stipulated that the following negotiating unit was 
appropriate: 
Included: Supervisor of Operations and Maintenance. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a secret-ballot election was 
held on June 1, 1998, at which a majority of ballots were cast 
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against representation by the petitioner. 
Inasmuch as the results of the election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the unit who cast ballots do 
not desire to be represented for the purpose of collective 
bargaining by the petitioner, IT IS ORDERED that the petition 
should be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
fare A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
INTERNATIONAL LOCAL 182, INTERNATIONAL 
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS (AFL-CIO), 
" ~ Petitioner, " " 
-and- CASE NO. C-4503 
UTICA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the International Local 182, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (AFL-CIO) has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
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grievances. 
Unit: Included: Bus dispatcher, purchasing agent, assistant 
director of food service, associate director of 
food service, maintenance foreman. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER,- I-g^ -IS----ORDERED---t-hat--the---afeove---named---pu-bM-s----empl-oye-r-
shall negotiate collectively with the International Local 182, 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (AFL-CIO). The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
) and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO,, 
" "" Petitioner7™ ~ " ~'~~ 
-and- CASE NO. C-4552 
CITY OF AUBURN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-4552 
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Unit: Included: Community development program manager, capital 
improvement program manager, street maintenance 
supervisor, water maintenance supervisor, sewer 
maintenance supervisor, sanitation supervisor, 
assistant fire chief, secretary to director of 
planning/economic development, director of 
human rights, assessor, superintendent of parks 
and recreation, deputy city clerk and 
- treasurer _ 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ M a r * 6 "A^  Abbott, Member 
\ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
" " "Petit Toner", 
-and- CASE NO. C-4733 
QUEENSBURY UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
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Unit: Included: Full-time and regular part-time cleaners, 
custodians, groundsmen and maintenance 
employees. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
•••s-ha-1-1--negotiate-eolleet-ively~-with--the- Civil -Service--Employees -
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation ' 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
^ Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-472 6 




AIDES LEAGUE OF LINDENHURST, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
Certification - C-4726 - 2 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
-Unit: Included-:—Al-l---ai-de-s----and--feea-Gla-i-Hg--a-s-si-s-ta-nfes--i -
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
\ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 42 4, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
-Petitioner-, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4725 
NEW LEBANON CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, APSCME, APL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
) : 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
) above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
Certification - C-4725 
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parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Bus Driver, Bus Driver/Cleaner, Bus 
Driver/Mechanic, Cleaner Clerk, Clerical Aide, 
Computer-System Operator/Custodian^ Head—Bus-
Driver, Head Custodian, Library Aide, 
Maintenance Worker, School Nurse, Teacher Aide, 
Teaching Assistant, Typist. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RIDGE ROAD PROFESSIONAL FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 37 94, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
~~ Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4720 
RIDGE ROAD FIRE DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Ridge Road Professional 
Firefighters Association, Local 3794, IAFF, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-4720 
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Unit: Included: All firefighters. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Ridge Road Professional 
-Fi-ref-i-ghters -AssQC-iation,- -Leca-l—3-7-94-,-'.-lA-F-F-,—A-F-L-G-IO—••—The-duty-feo-
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman Michael R. Cuevas, cnain 
./fa. /? & 
'Mar£ A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 





MTA-LONG ISLAND BUS, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Subway-Surface Supervisors 
Association has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All Transportation Coordinators, Paratransit. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
CASE NO. C-4705 
,-"\ Certification - C-4705 - 2 -
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Subway-Surface Supervisors 
Association. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and Confer in good 
- — — -faith with- respect to -wages
 7 hours,—and-other— terms and -
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
) DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
' Marc A. Abbott, Member 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BRIARCLIFF TEACHERS ASSOCIATION/NYSUT, 
Petitioner, 
-and-
BRIARCLIFF MANOR UNION FREE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Briarcliff Teachers 
Association/NYSUT has been designated and selected by a majority 
of the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Teacher Aides. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
CASE NO. C-47 04 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Briarcliff Teachers 
Association/NYSUT. The duty to negotiate collectively includes 
the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in 
good -f-a-i-fe-h- with- -:ee sp e e-fe—t ©—wage s-,- -hour s--,-- and -Q fehe-r-t e m s - and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
\ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner;, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4693 
INCORPORATED VILLAGE OF AMITYVILLE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification C-4693 
Unit: Included: Except as specifically excluded, all employees 
in the titles of Clerk/Typist, Senior 
Clerk/Typist, Stenographer, Senior 
Stenographer, Principal Stenographer and 
Account Clerk. 
Excluded: The Stenographer who serves as the Mayor's 
Secretary and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: July 1, 1998 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
UL vh 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
